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ABSTRACT: Business ethics is often understood as a variety of professional ethics, and thus 
distinct from ordinary morality in an important way. This article seeks to challenge two ways 
of defending this claim: first, from the nature of business practice, and second, from the 
contribution of business. The former argument fails because it undermines our ability to rule 
out a professional-ethics approach to a number of disreputable practices. The latter argument 
fails because the contribution of business is extrinsic to business in a way that distinguishes 
from the established professions. The article ultimately suggests we adopt a more aspirational 




Business ethics is often understood as a variety of professional ethics. This article argues that 
such an understanding is mistaken. One notable feature of ‘professional ethics’ is its 
distinctness from ordinary morality. While acting in their professional capacity, the 
professional is guided by the aims and commitments of the profession, not by their own 
personal normative commitments. While all jobs require us to behave in ways we might not 
choose to outside of work, there is an especially ethically salient distinction between 
professional role morality, and ordinary, everyday morality. While this distinction may well be 
legitimate in established professions, such as medicine and law, it is not appropriate to business 
ethics. 
The following section provides a brief overview of the professional ethics model of business 
ethics, before going on to consider two broad arguments in favour of understanding business 
ethics in this way. Firstly, an argument from the nature of business practice, which draws on 
the training it requires, its status as a recognisable practice, the informational impactedness 
involved. This argument fails because it undermines our ability to distinguish business from a 
variety of practices that are not regarded as professions and for which the professional ethics 
model is clearly ill-suited. Secondly, an argument from the ethical contribution of business. 
While business falls short of the ideal of public service which animates the established 
professions, it nevertheless contributes to both personal and social prosperity. However, this 
argument fails because the contribution of business is contingent and ultimately extrinsic to 
business practice in a way that distinguishes it from the established professions. In light of 
these critical arguments, the article goes on to sketch a conception of business ethics in which 
our ordinary ethical commitments, including our highest ethical aspirations, are kept in view.  
Such a position encourages us to retain a place for philosophical reflections on business ethics. 
While it may seem questionable due to its ‘anti-capitalist’ tendencies, there are a variety of 
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ways in which a theory can be considered anti-capitalist, and even a more robustly anti-
capitalist approach can still contribute to the conversation in business ethics. 
 
BUSINESS ETHICS AS PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 
As far back as 1914, Brandeis claimed that business “should be, and to some extent already is, 
one of the professions” (1914, p.1), and that “[i]n the field of modern business… mere money-
making cannot be regarded as the legitimate end” (1914, p.5), claims which Abend, in his 
excellent history of business ethics, says have been echoed by “literally hundreds of others” 
(2014, p.227). This understanding of business informed the development of business schools 
in the 20th century. James claims that  
[A]s they developed in the course of the twentieth century, graduate business schools aimed at 
professionalising management. Especially in the United States, they were designed to give 
modern managers a new status that would be commensurable with a changed and enhanced role 
in an evolving and improving economy... Their founders wanted a higher prestige and a more 
abstract and academic education for managers who would form an elite. (2009, p.16) 
However, Khurana (2010) notes that while professionalism was an ideal at play in the 
emergence of business schools throughout the 20th century, this is now an aspiration, rather 
than a reality. Parker (2018) likewise notes the frequency with which commentaries on the 
historical development of business schools lament the drift away from the goal of 
professionalisation. But even if these educational institutions never quite attained the status of 
professional training schools, the notion that business ethics is a variety of professional ethics 
remains.  
The professions were traditionally understood as “occupations which have certain shared 
characteristics… Whether or not an occupation is more or less professionalized depends on 
how thoroughly it manifests these characteristics” (Callahan 1988, p.26). This classic 
understanding of professions regards professionalism as comprising three distinctive elements: 
the possession of a systematic body of knowledge or expertise, a commitment to a good broader 
than self-interest, and that the central activity of the occupation possesses an overall ethical 
character (Despotidou and Prastacos 2012).  
Sometimes professional status is treated as an ethical aspiration for business. Koehn (1994) 
argues that for professionalism in business to succeed, both professionals and clients must be 
convinced of the moral nature of the profession. Steverson (2012) argues that business should 
be a profession, animated by the ideal of service. A similar impulse underpins Khurana and 
Nohria’s (2008) discussion of management. Bowie argues that we should treat businesspersons 
as professionals provided they adopt an attitude of professionalism, understood in terms of 
respecting the duties of the business role (1985, p.44).  
In other cases, business ethics is understood as already having a kind of professional status. 
Brown advocates “a view of managers as (or at least as relevantly akin to) professionals (such 
as lawyers and physicians) whose operating within an institution partially constitutes their 
professional status and contributes to the ethical standards they are to live up to in that role” 
(2013, p.490 – original emphasis). Donaldson argues that we should treat businesspersons as 
professionals because the self-critical rationality required to improve corporate strategy 
requires professionalism and professional values (2000, p.91). Similarly, von Kriegstein 
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suggests that “managerial obligations are best understood as part of a professional code” (2016, 
p.445). Heath argues that  
[i]n the same way that medical ethics concerns, first and foremost, ethical questions that arise 
from the professional role of doctors, and legal ethics deals with questions that arise from the 
professional practice of lawyers, business ethics deals with questions that arise out of the 
professional role of managers. (2014, p.69) 
While the literature on business ethics and professionalism covers a wide variety of topics, and 
there are numerous conceptions of professionalism in play, my focus in this article is on this 
latter set of views, which regard professionalism as an established part of business. The aspect 
of professional ethics which requires a kind of ‘bracketing-off’, to borrow a term from Jackall 
(2010), from the ethics of ordinary life is of particular interest here. On this model, the 
professional focuses on the aims and commitments of the profession while acting in their 
professional capacity, rather than their own personal commitments. This bracketing-off does 
not mean that the precepts of ordinary morality are lost from view entirely, but rather that their 
force is suspended due to the context provided by the professional role. As a result, business 
ethics is supposed to take on a largely explicatory role, and bring out the ethically salient 
features of business practice. 
The distinction between personal and professional morality goes back at least as far as 
Durkheim. In a lecture series delivered between 1890-1900, Durkheim claimed that ‘moral 
particularism’ – his preferred term for the notion that some ethical imperatives apply only to 
occupiers of certain roles – “has no place in individual morals… [but] goes on to reach its 
climax in professional ethics” (1992, p.5). This feature is what justifies the understanding of 
professional ethics as a kind of ‘role morality’ (Swanton 2007, Radtke 2008). Alzola captures 
this conception of business ethics well: “To a large extent, business ethics is role ethics. Much 
business activity is conducted through firms involving roles and special relationships, which 
are allegedly governed by special principles, constituting a morality on their own” (2017, p.48). 
This line of thinking has given rise to the suggested adoption of professional pledges in 
business settings (see de Bruin 2016). 
This notion of ‘special principles’ underpinning professional ethics is perhaps best illustrated 
by the example of the legal profession, given that its adversarial nature stands in contrast to the 
cooperative tenor of ordinary morality. According to Hursthouse, “[l]awyers’ professional role 
often permits – indeed requires – them to do things that would be wrong if they were acting 
outside their professional role” (2008, p.236). Examples might include aggressively 
questioning an emotionally vulnerable victim of crime, and seeking to cast doubt on their 
reliability. A similar point could be made about respecting confidentiality in the medical 
profession, even when breaching it would lead to some greater good. While others have denied 
that professional ethics justifies straight-forwardly unethical actions – in contrast to 
Hursthouse, Applbaum claims that it would be wrong to conclude that professions can “mint 
moral permissions to do what otherwise would be morally prohibited” (1999, p.3) – there 
remains a sense in which professional obligations are distinct from our ordinary ethical 
obligations, and indeed their nature as professional obligations is what justifies this special 
status. What this means is that ethical deliberation which occurs within the professional role is 
subordinated to the demands of that role, but not to our ordinary, everyday ethical concerns. 




The moniker ‘professional ethics’ is somewhat misleading, however. This is in part because a 
special, role-differentiated morality does not always attach to recognised professions. 
Engineering ethics, for instance, seems to align with ordinary morality. There are also 
occupations whose status as profession or otherwise is not established, such as the military 
(though see Caforio (1988) for an argument in favour of understanding the military as a 
profession), and occupations that are typically regarded as non-professions, such as politics or 
various competitive sports, where a kind of limited exemption from ordinary ethics may be 
justifiable. Furthermore, to think of the professions in primarily normative terms may well be 
naïve. The sociology of professions tells us that professionalisation is a process, and 
professional status is an achievement in which the power of the putative professional group 
plays a central role. It is not a matter of whether an occupation meets a certain set of necessary 
and sufficient criteria for the status of profession, instead the nature of the work may be 
secondary to the relevant institutional processes (see Muzio et al. 2013), even if there are some 
limitations to the sorts of occupations which could conceivably attain such a status.  
Nevertheless, it is worth retaining the term ‘professional ethics’ because the model of ethics 
central to the argument that follows has typically been discussed under this heading in the 
academic literature. Martin suggests that the dominant perspective in professional ethics holds 
that it “consists entirely of the moral requirements attached to a profession,” and that “[a]ny 
additional personal commitments are, by their very nature, excluded” (2000, 4).  Freedman 
argues that we often “attribute to professionals a morality of their own, attached to their 
professional role… we feel that in reaching decisions professionals are more constrained by 
their professional values than are nonprofessionals and, conversely, take into less account those 
considerations which ordinarily apply” (1978, p.1). Gewirth’s ‘separatist thesis’ – not to be 
confused with the ‘separation thesis’ that regards economic values as separate from ethical 
values (see Freeman 1994, Sandberg 2008) – holds that “professionals, by virtue of their 
expertise and their consequent roles, have rights and duties that are unique to themselves and 
that may hence be not only different from, but even contrary to, the rights and duties that are 
found in other segments of morality” (1986, p.282). Oakley and Cocking note that 
“[p]rofessionals, it is said, have no use for simple lists of virtues and vices. The complexities 
and constraints of professional roles create peculiar moral demands on the individuals who 
occupy them. Traits that are vices in ordinary life are praised as virtues in the context of 
professional roles.” (2001, p.1). Even though there is an important distinction here, this 
dichotomy is likely exaggerated. After all, the goods served by most established professions 
are typically manifestations of our most cherished ethical concerns (for healing the sick, 
enacting justice, and so on). Indeed, while professions are granted a limited exemption from 
some aspects of ordinary morality, this paper goes on to argue that this exemption is only 
justified because of this intimate relation to important ethical goods. 
The following sections seek to challenge the view that business ethics, in particular as it relates 
to managers, should be understood as a variety of professional ethics, in the sense outlined 
here. They do so by exploring two arguments in favour of the professional ethics model of 
business ethics, one focusing on the nature of business practice, and one focusing on the 





THE NATURE OF BUSINESS 
It may seem intuitive to regard business ethics as a kind of professional ethics on account of 
the nature of business, which seems in some ways distinct from various non-professional 
occupations. The domain of business seems to be at least relatively akin to a professional 
setting, partly in virtue of the skills it requires, its distinctive nature, and the position managers 
of businesses find themselves in, amongst other things. Brown plausibly notes that “actual 
social circumstances,” are such that “managers can understand themselves as professionals” 
(2013, p.499). Calls for a kind of professional ‘oath’, to mirror medicine’s Hippocratic oath, 
for business practitioners are in line with widely held intuitions about the status of business, 
whereas they would be manifestly inappropriate for many occupations. This is particularly true 
of management in light of the fiduciary duty it involves, an important facet of a wide range of 
professional relationships. That managers have this duty to shareholders is clearly of ethical 
importance, even if there is room for disagreement about how significant this fact is. 
Furthermore, there are specialisms within business practice which clearly require specific 
knowledge, e.g. of supply chains, employment law as it relates to HRM, and so on. This section 
examines some reflections on various aspects of business practice that seem to justify the 
adoption of the professional model and argue that they fall short of this aim. 
Schaefer notes that “[t]he professional life requires competence in one’s field, and a permanent 
commitment to performance in that field” (1984, p.270). One marker of both competence and 
a longstanding commitment is an extensive training programme, which is standard in 
established professions such as medicine and law. Such a training programme imparts the 
requisite expertise and, at least as a result of opportunity cost, suggests someone is likely to 
devote a significant portion of their life, likely their entire career, to the occupation in question. 
In this vein, Donaldson suggests that business managers should be regarded as professionals, 
and adds that “[b]y “business manager” I refer to those who are formally trained in the skills 
designed to effect successful management, to, for example, the students who graduate from 
MBA and undergraduate business programs.” (Donaldson 2000, p.89). This is a significant 
qualification. 
There is a wider sense of business practice that does not require the technical expertise and 
accreditation Donaldson has in mind. As Khurana et al. (2005) note, one can enter business 
without any formal training. Most people would think twice about taking legal counsel or 
receiving medical treatment from practitioners who do not possess formal accreditation, but 
such an aversion does not exist in business. This is in part because the scope of business is so 
broad. According to Gini and Marcoux’s plausible definition, “business is, at its most 
fundamental level, the activity of executing exchange transactions” (2012, p.22), which can 
involve any number of particular activities. Because of this, business extends beyond those 
formally trained through an undergraduate business degree or an MBA programme. If we were 
to accept Donaldson’s stipulation, it would be perfectly possible to have two people – one of 
whom has graduated from a business programme, one of whom has not – working in the same 
organisation, doing the same job, with the same degree of competence, and be forced to regard 
only one of them as a professional. That this apparently arbitrary apportioning of professional 
status to one but not the other seems to be an unattractive consequence of Donaldson’s claim. 
Nevertheless, Donaldson recognises the unusually open nature of business. He says, “[t]he 
instrumental skills of the manager are entirely relative to the conception of the function of the 
6 
 
corporate organization. A successful manager is one who serves the corporation as an agent 
well, achieving the ends of the organization successfully” (Donaldson 2000, p.89). The ends 
of a business organization are not as liable to be part of a single, evolving body of knowledge 
as is the case in the established professions. Contrast this with accounting, perhaps the 
profession most closely aligned with business, which does have a have a specialised body of 
knowledge and expertise at its core, and does require specialised training and accreditation. 
Yet, despite this open nature, business still constitutes a recognisable form of activity. Indeed, 
according to Marcoux, “although business is not a profession, like medicine and law, it is a 
practice. We have an intuitive grasp of what it is to do business and it is engaging in that activity 
that makes the entities engaging in it business entities rather than entities of another kind” 
(2009, p.21 – original emphasis). This line of thinking, “invites the business ethicist to talk 
about business, the way the medical ethicist talks about medicine and the legal ethicist talks 
about law” (Marcoux 2009, p.31). This invitation is, in effect, to focus on an explicatory 
account of business ethics, and so to treat business ethics as a variety of professional ethics and 
in legitimate possession of distinctive norms and values, without requiring any further claims 
about the status of business as a profession. 
However, this appeal to medical ethics and legal ethics as illustrations of the shape business 
ethics ought to take, on the grounds that it is a ‘practice’, seems ill-equipped to justify an 
explicatory approach to business ethics. This is because it applies to disreputable activities such 
as torture and execution as much as it does to medicine and law. Torture and execution are 
practices, in this sense. Each has its own distinctive internal logic, just as each requires a certain 
degree of expert knowledge. We would not, however, advocate an explicatory conception of 
torture ethics, i.e. an approach which takes the basic nature and aims of torture as a normative 
bedrock, as Marcoux suggests we should with business. Neither the status as a practice, in this 
sense, nor the requirement of specialised knowledge is sufficient. There is, of course, an 
academic literature on the ethics of torture, but it is not practice-focused (see, for instance, 
Brecher 2007, Waldron 2010). One suspects this is because the practice of torture is not, in 
fact, good. As Waldron notes, it “is dispiriting as well as shameful to have to turn our attention 
to this issue” (2005, p.1683) because the question of whether torture was permissible had, for 
so long, been considered closed. 
Even if torturers regard themselves as serving the community, by procuring information about 
possible atrocities for instance, we have enough reason to be sceptical about this claim to expect 
it to be addressed in any discussion of the ethics of torture. Because torture is so highly 
contested, we could not simply treat it as a form of professional ethics, exempt from our 
ordinary ethical concerns. That is to say, we do not typically or immediately regard torture as 
being important to human wellbeing as we do with medicine and law. The good it serves, and 
indeed whether it serves any good, are open to legitimate debate. There may be cases for 
defending torture (e.g. Steinhoff 2006) but these take themselves to be defending a highly 
contentious position, and as a result do not proceed along practice-focused lines.  
The general distinction between practice-focused and non-practice-focused lines of enquiry 
into the ethics of various occupations seems largely to track the distinction between established 
professions and non-professions. Medicine and law are both practices, so are torture and 
executions, and so are more reputable occupations such as plumbing and working as a security 
guard. However, only medicine and law from this list are professions, and only medicine and 
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law are subject to a practice-focused, explicatory line of ethical enquiry. Therefore, it seems 
that it is not this practice-status that allows us to treat medical and legal ethics as practice-
focused. The best explanation of why medical ethics and legal ethics as fields of academic 
enquiry are practice-focused, is that the worthiness of serving human health and upholding 
justice are not in doubt. At this stage, it seems that only when an activity has a legitimate claim 
to have the ethical quality of the established professions, will a largely explicatory ethical 
enquiry be apt.  
Before turning to the issue of the goods served by business in the following section, there is 
another argument for conceiving of business ethics as a variety of professional ethics that is 
worthy of consideration: that put forward by Heath. Heath advances an explicatory or 
articulatory view of business ethics, which treats it as a kind of professional ethics and thus 
offers “agents limited “moral immunity” from the norms of everyday morality” (Heath 2014, 
p.110). He says, “[a]ccording to the “professional ethics” view, business ethics represents an 
attempt to articulate a code of conduct that is already implicit both in the structure of corporate 
law and in the best practices of working managers.” (Heath 2014, p.70), and his reasons for 
defending this view focus on the position of trust held by managers. 
This trust requirement emerges out of what Williamson (1973) refers to as ‘informational 
impactedness’. In certain occupations, contracts are only able to specify obligations and aims 
in vague terms, and thus those who are so employed have a degree of discretion over how they 
work. “The purchaser often lacks not only the information and skills to determine the best 
course on her own, but is often incapable of even verifying that the supplier has done so after 
the fact” (Heath 2014, p.71). This seems to open the door to any number of occupations which 
are obviously not professions to be accounted as such – contractors, hair stylists, and mechanics 
are Heath’s examples (ibid). In these cases, thanks to word of mouth, online reviews, as well 
as the possibility of repeat purchases, “the market does a tolerable job of overcoming important 
information asymmetries” (ibid). What matters for business ethics is the trust placed in the 
manager that is necessary in the absence of such mechanisms. According to Heath, “[t]he 
nature of the managerial role is such that they need to be both trusted and trustworthy… The 
fact that they are in a position of trust is what matters” (2014, p.73). 
However, these markers of professionalism also apply to many non-professional roles, 
including those that do not seem to be subject to online reviews or repeat purchases. Occupants 
of all manner of lower-level supervisory roles, in, for instance, retail stores, may all find 
themselves in such a position of trust regarding access to cash and possession of keys. 
Likewise, refuse collectors are trusted not to examine the contents of people’s bins for 
discarded personal letters or evidence of embarrassing purchases, and we cannot easily verify 
whether they have not done so. Nevertheless, we are not tempted to treat ethical enquiry into 
these fields as varieties of professional ethics (and indeed, that is not how they proceed. See 
Mujtaba and Sims (2006) for retail workers, and Hamilton et al. (2019) for refuse collectors). 
We certainly want members of these occupations not to abuse the trust placed in them, and we 
may even hope they will be partly motivated by a desire to contribute to the common good, but 
such occupations do not seem to be candidates for professional status. 
Word of mouth plays a role for the established professions too, and reports of poor practice are 
easy to escalate thanks to social media and online reviewing systems, without us being tempted 
to regard them as possessing a status similar to non-professional occupations. We may return 
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to mechanics, plumbers, and hairdressers regularly, but we do not typically make repeated 
purchases from roofers, for instance, and have no say over our refuse collectors. Informational 
impactedness also applies to assassins and drug dealers – both have access to a great deal of 
knowledge that their clients cannot realistically procure, and transactions with either requires 
a good degree of trust. Yet, as with torturers and executioners, we would not endorse an 
explicatory approach to drug-dealer ethics or assassination ethics. Morality might live in our 
practices, but only in the good ones. 
In fields such as medicine and law, the worthwhile ends served is what justifies the individual 
actions that may, abstracted from that context, appear to be contrary to the standards of ordinary 
ethics. According to the self-understanding of the legal profession, both the role and institution 
typically contribute to the good, even if not every action the role requires does. This may be an 
unrealistically optimistic perspective on law (see Norrie (2017) for an examination of some of 
the ways in which law fails to live up to this standard). However, even such an optimistic view 
need not hold that every role in the broadest sense of law, which includes enforcement as well 
as judicial and penal elements, contributes to justice. Correspondingly, we would not think that 
every element of law is equally exempt from our ordinary ethical concerns. Indeed, it is only 
where suspending our ordinary ethical concerns has some clear connection to the overarching 
goods served by the law that we accept it. Providing forceful advocacy even for the likely guilty 
arguably helps to preserve justice, and may even be partially constitutive of justice, even if it 
facilitates injustice in particular cases, and so even here our ordinary ethical concerns occupy 
a privileged place. 
Following the rules of legal practice is good, even if the particular action that results, 
considered in isolation from the overreaching institution, is bad. If a legal role as a whole were 
shown to be contrary to this overarching institution, then this would be sufficient to warrant 
criticism. This suggests that the kind of professional ethics required by law depends on our 
belief that law – its institutions and its roles – serves some important good. Thus, the limited 
immunity professional ethics has from the requirements of ordinary ethics is itself subject to 
ordinary ethics. Even though there remain jurisdictions in which, even now, torture is a 
standard legal interrogation technique and execution a standard punishment, it still seems 
unlikely that we would be satisfied by an explicatory approach to torture and execution ethics 
simply because the overarching institution of law serves the good. This is because we recognize 
there is, to say the very least, scope for disagreement about whether torture and executions 
contribute to the good. While business enjoys greater repute than does torture, its status remains 
open to question and thus it is not clear that this argumentative move is open to those who 
would defend the professional ethics conception of business ethics. Therefore, the nature of 
business as an activity seems to be unable to satisfactorily defend the view that business ethics 
is a variety of professional ethics. Indeed, any attempt to make sense of this professional status 
raises ethical questions. In light of this, the following section turns to the contribution of 
business as a possible basis for understanding business ethics as a variety of professional ethics. 
 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF BUSINESS 
The previous section argued that a number of arguments in favour of conceiving of business 
ethics as a variety of professional ethics left us unable to adequately explain why a range of 
disreputable activities did not also deserve such a privileged status. The arguments considered 
9 
 
focused on the nature of business, and thus considerations internal to business practice. This 
section turns to the contribution of business and argue that an appeal to the goods served by 
business still do not warrant accounting business ethics as a variety of professional ethics. 
As noted above, professionalism is often taken to imply a broad commitment to ethical service. 
Does business live up to this ideal? Apparently not. Even those who have an optimistic view 
about business sometimes note that, while it has the potential to improve all of our lives, it in 
fact leads to “widening income inequality, greater personal debt, and environmental 
degradation” (Edelson 2019, p.420). Indeed, business ethicists are unlikely to run out of 
dubious practices to research. Anderson (2017) documents an array of workplace practices 
which curtail the freedoms of employees. Crane (2013) explores slavery as a management 
practice. Berkey (2021) examines sweatshop labour. Van Buren et al. (2019) outline the ways 
in which business strategies enable the use of human trafficking in supply chains. 
Zyglidopoulos et al. (2020) discuss organizational corruption. These are just some examples 
from a long list. We struggle to hold corporations to basic legality (Ciepley 2019), and so the 
notion that they could be made to reliably act in the public interest seems fantastical. This is in 
part because the interests of owners are at odds with the public interest, and so even if we ignore 
some of the more remarkable examples of criminal behaviour, we may still think that standard 
business can be harmful to the public in a variety of ways (Stout 2012). 
However, medicine and law are also liable to ethical failure and have, themselves, been subject 
to scandals of various kinds. Yet, this does not make it easier to regard business ethics as 
deserving the status of professional ethics, not least because critiques of medicine and law are 
most apt when, and to the extent that, these fields most closely resemble business. Thus, such 
critiques often draw attention to the role of profit (see Mariner 1995, Agmon 2021), or 
“illustrate how a dominant managerial and economic focus maintains and reproduces a 
constrained form of morality, limited to instrumental, utilitarian and commercial ends” which 
undermines professionalism (Chow and Calvard 2021, p.213). Indeed, it would be wrong to 
exaggerate the extent to which legal ethics, for instance, does proceed in an explicatory manner. 
The institutionalization, and practical realities, of the professions as they currently operate may 
mean they are worthy of critique with regards to various specificities. In law, examples include 
whether closed material procedures are compatible with justice (Pointon 2019), or whether 
there is a compelling rationale for retributive punishment (Lippke 2019, Reeves 2019). 
However, the fact that law obviously seeks, however imperfectly, to serve some uncontested 
good, justice, means that a practice-focused approach has a prima facie plausibility. Indeed, the 
inadequacy of law as an institution which nevertheless aims at the good of justice is precisely 
why an explicatory focus is more likely to be apt. The attempt at explication in legal ethics 
marks an attempt to give expression to that in law which seeks to overcome the tendency of 
our existing legal institutions and practices to fail to promote justice, by re-affirming a 
commitment to that core value of justice. The institution of law is liable to distort the good at 
which it aims, and so the task of clarifying this aim is worthwhile. However, it is not obvious 
that business has such a dualistic nature, as it is not obvious that business does, in fact, aim at 
the good. Without establishing that the ends of business are good, then an analogy with the 
established professions seems only to further obscure matters. While an altruistic commitment 
to public service may be out of the question, there are a variety of lesser goods which might 
suffice. The remainder of this section will examine the following: facilitating consumer choice, 
personal prudence, corporate citizenship, and finally social prosperity.  
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Clearly business is conducive to the good of consumer choice. It is undeniable that, within 
capitalist society, we have lots of different goods available to us, most of what we consume 
must be understood as luxury goods, given that cheaper – and by definition less appealing – 
options are foregone in almost any choice. However, the manipulative nature of marketing 
means desires may often be manufactured, rather than arising in a less morally troubling way 
(Lippke 1989, 1999; Galbraith 2007). Creating a desire for a product in order to satisfy it in 
this way is, on the face of it, a meagre good, and certainly not one which would justify business 
ethics being considered distinct from our ordinary ethical concerns. Furthermore, satisfying 
choice has a convincing claim as a good where the choices are good. Where the choices lead 
to the ills of consumerism, e.g. the way it encourages the depletion of natural resources (Cohen 
and Murphy 2001) and infantilizes people (Barber 2008), then this cannot constitute a genuine 
good, let alone a sufficiently substantial good to justify the professional ethics model in 
business ethics. 
Machan (2007, 2013) argues that business is a profession concerned with personal prudence. 
He argues that the “moral principle supporting business is prudence, taking reasonable care of 
oneself in life, including economically. Business is the profession that emerges from this, just 
as medicine emerges from the prudential care for one’s health – health care and wealth care, 
one might say” (Machan 2013, p.1206). However, unlike business, the established professions 
have a unique and intimate connection to the goods they serve. The economic self-interest at 
the heart of Machan’s claim functions quite differently to the service the medical profession 
provides to society, and thus serves to highlight the difference between the two.  Medicine, by 
definition, cannot be usurped as a practice that contributes to health, whereas business is just 
one way of prudentially looking after oneself economically among many. Furthermore, the 
established professions are not self-referential in the way that Machan imagines. Healthcare is 
not especially bound up with taking care of oneself medically. We can readily imagine the 
excellent doctor who chain-smokes, drinks to excess, and abhors exercise. 
Another available avenue is to focus not on one’s own prosperity, but that of society, in a broad, 
political sense, which may be best understood as an extended conception of ‘corporate 
citizenship’ (Matten and Crane 2005). On this view, business can contribute to society by 
fulfilling some of the functions that, traditionally, have been exclusively addressed by nation 
states. Businesses now 
contribute to public health, education, social security, and the protection of human rights, or 
engage in self-regulation to fill the gaps in legal regulation and to promote societal peace and 
stability. These business firms often operate as social entrepreneurs and directly serve the public 
interest by their resources (money, assets, know-how, etc.) and their creativity (Scherer et al. 
2014, p.148).  
However, business does not contribute to political goods by its very nature, as medicine 
contributes to health, and law to justice. Rather, it must be made to do so by an act of role-
transcendent volition on the part of business practitioners, or as a result of regulation. In neither 
case can this be said to be evidence that business serves a good in the way that medicine or law 
does. In the former case, the individual act of volition is entirely extrinsic to the practice of 
business and is vulnerable to the changing whims of particular agents, and thus of being 
discarded as an aim. In the latter case, it is the practice of regulators and legislators that deserves 
praise. Regulation can no doubt contribute to the ethical quality of business (Cavanagh 2004), 
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but this is a rather different point, and it is worth bearing in mind that business involvement in 
politics can be ethically troubling too (see Alzola 2013). 
Finally, we turn to contributing to social prosperity in a more restricted, economic sense – as 
the good that business serves. In Heath’s words, “price competition is desirable [because] it 
generates external benefits for society at large” (2014, p.100). Indeed, Heath (2019a) argues 
that it is a common mistake to think that the market is orientated towards profit. Instead, the 
market is designed so that each firm’s pursuit of profit undermines the profitability of the 
overall sector, which allows goods and services to be efficiently allocated. According to 
McMahon, the advantage of the market is that it is able to “allocate resources to producers and 
distribute products to consumers in a Pareto-optimal way” (1981, p.255), in which it is 
impossible to make someone better off without making someone else worse off. So, on this 
view, businesses are central actors in the market, and the market’s value is its contribution to 
society through the “smooth operation of the price system” (Heath 2014, p.79), which enhances 
social prosperity. As Kay puts it “the purpose [of the market economy] is the production of 
goods and services, profit the means” (2003, p.351). 
However, while it may well speak in favour of the value of markets, and while social prosperity 
may well be comparable in importance to human health or justice, this argument is unable to 
salvage the claim that business ethics should be understood as a variety of professional ethics. 
Social prosperity might be the overarching function of the system, but from the perspective of 
the individual business or the person acting in accordance with their business role, the 
enhancement of societal prosperity may be deemed a welcome incidental consequence and not 
the central aim of business practice. Indeed, in some cases business practice is directly contrary 
to the good of the market, and geared towards exploiting information asymmetries, 
manipulating consumers, and so on. 
Indeed, while Heath may present a convincing case for the value of the market as a result of its 
function, though perhaps only under idealized conditions (Moriarty, 2020), he also notes that 
markets are not as competitive as economists are liable to think: “the same argument that shows 
that markets must necessarily drive out ethics can be used to show that markets must also drive 
out racial discrimination, and yet there are many examples of racial discrimination flourishing 
in market economies” (2018, p.516). Indeed, Heath also notes that businesses sometimes 
benefit from “abusing employees, cheating customers, or taking advantage of suppliers” (Heath 
2014, p.79). In business it seems that relatively few people could act in a way that reflects a 
commit to the goods of the market and not expect to be sacked from their job. Thus, there is 
still a disconnect between the macro level of the market’s good function, and the level of 
individual ‘professional’ practice. So actually Heath’s position – and what Brown calls the 
‘Perfect Market Rule’: “Do not generate or take advantage of market inefficiencies, notably 
avoid imposition of negative externalities” (Brown 2013, p.500) – is actually subversive. It 
requires managers to act according to a principle their employers would, on many and perhaps 
most occasions, oppose. 
The profound tension between the ‘means’ (i.e. profit) and the ‘end’ provision of goods, 
communication of needs and wants through price mechanism is what makes business so at odds 
with other professions. We can readily imagine a dictatorial political regime having the 
function of reducing crime, promoting literacy, curbing environmental pollution, and so on, 
without us concluding that dictatorial government ultimately serves the good in a way that 
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would make us inclined to regard the ethics of dictatorship as legitimately bracketed-off from 
the ethics of ordinary life. 
In other words, I want to claim that the central goods of business are external to business, and 
thus stand in contrast to the manner in which health is related to medicine and justice to law. 
As noted above, there are plenty of examples of real businesses failing to serve particular 
goods, and indeed of business facilitating some ill. When an electric chair manufacturer 
increases sales and thus profits, it succeeds as a business, it contributes to the market’s function 
of communicating where ‘need’ is, but it is possible that it also fails ethically in an important 
sense. The structure of the medical profession and of the legal profession is to aim at the good 
in a more direct way. When businesses make philanthropic donations, this is distinct from the 
practice of business, whereas a lawyer doing pro-bono work is still practicing law. Were a 
business to always and only offer its goods and services for free – thus ceasing to engage in 
exchange transactions – we would probably regard it having ceased to be a business and 
become a charity, whereas an organization that only offered legal services for free would still 
be engaged in law.  
Providing medical treatment is distinct from producing and selling goods in the hope of making 
a profit. The latter may contribute to social welfare through contributing to consumer choice, 
but the achievement of facilitating consumer choice has a less direct relationship to the activity 
that does the medical treatment. This point about the extrinsic relationship between business 
and the goods it serves is not about the relationship between particular goods and the overall 
‘real’ good of social prosperity. It is between the aimed at ‘goods’ of businesses – what they 
take themselves to be doing, and what they take as their goal – and the good provided by the 
competitive market as a whole. 
Producing and selling cola, for instance, in the hope of making a profit may contribute to 
consumer choice, but this is not the aim of the activity. Pepsi would not lament the demise of 
Coke if the latter went bust. Pepsi does not want to continually compete with Coke in order to 
produce cheaper or better quality cola. Business practice is often hostile to the market because 
market competition tends to drive prices down and erode profit. Healthcare is sometimes 
relatively marketized, and law often is, and yet there is something written into the nature of 
legal and medical practice that is at odds with the market mechanism i.e. an intrinsic 
relationship to the good they serve. 
The market is blind to that relationship. Preferences for bad things are met just as much as 
preferences for good things, and businesses themselves are often hostile to good things insofar 
as they may be substitutes for the products they offer. Thus, there is a fundamental asymmetry 
here. Healthcare is degraded as it becomes more marketized, business is elevated as it more 
closely aligns with the competitive ethos of the market. But there is something internal to the 
practice of medicine that aligns it with the good of healthcare, and something internal to the 
practice of business that misaligns it with the goods of the market. 
To return to the point about critiques of the established professions, even if we have 
reservations about how healthcare is institutionalized – particularly when it most closely 
approximates business – no one is tempted to argue that healthcare is not an important good in 
and of itself. Indeed, critiques of the institutionalization of healthcare proceed as they do 
precisely because healthcare is taken to be an important good. Given that we can take this as 
read, an explicatory approach, which seeks to draw out the ethical contours of medicine and 
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medical practice, seems to be legitimate. Medical practice can thus legitimately be afforded a 
limited exemption from ordinary ethics. However, criticism of business is rather more 
common. The fact that the aims of business are often contested suggests that it is not so 
deserving. For it to be plausible to claim that “the failure of CSR to serve as a corrective to the 
problematic effects of capitalism is, in fact, an inevitable consequence of the problematic 
dynamics of the capitalist system” (Schneider 2020, p.1303) demonstrates an important 
distinction between business ethics and ethical inquiry appropriate to the established 
professions. Indeed, if people began to question whether health or justice were goods, then the 
scope for a professional, practice-focused, or explicatory approach to medical and legal ethics 
would thereby be reduced. 
 
IN DEFENCE OF WISH LISTS 
One reason to be tempted by explicatory approaches to business ethics is the fact that the 
alternative can appear to consist of merely drawing up a “wish list of things that we would like 
corporations to do” (Heath 2019b, p.22). Indeed, according to Heath 
One of the major problems with traditional business ethics is that it treats morality as something 
entirely external to the practice of business. As a result, the pronouncements of ethicists tend to 
arrive like an alien imposition, which in turn gives businesspeople license to ignore them, on the 
grounds that the expectations are simply incompatible with the demands of running a successful 
business (2020, p.x). 
It is easy to sympathise with this claim. However, while we might wish to reject the view that 
the task of philosophy is to dream up unrealizable utopias, we might also reject the view that 
philosophy’s task is to explicate dubious practice. In light of this, I wish to offer a qualified 
defence of the ‘wish list’ approach to business ethics in this section, one that accepts that 
reflection on how our ‘wishes’ might be realised is important, but one which nevertheless holds 
that we must resist the ideology of quietism that underpins the explicatory approach.  
The extent to which the pronouncements of business ethics must feel like an alien imposition 
to those who practice business depends as much upon the state of business as it does on the 
state of business ethics. Indeed, it would be a mistake to hold that ready acceptance by business 
practitioners would be an unqualified indicator of merit, just as it would be a mistake to think 
that our best account of statesmanlike behaviour in politics would be subject to the approval of 
real politicians, or our best account of sportsmanship subject to the approval of real professional 
athletes. In such domains, various competitive pressures – not to mention self-exculpatory 
delusions – may make practitioners less reliable as judges of the practices in question, and 
indeed unreceptive to external insights. Nozick’s comment on the practice of philosophy is 
instructive here:  
Though philosophy is carried on as a coercive activity, the penalty philosophers wield is, after 
all, rather weak. If the other person is willing to bear the label of “irrational” or “having the worse 
arguments”, he can skip away happily maintaining his previous belief. He will be trailed, of 
course, by the philosopher furiously hurling philosophical imprecations: “What do you mean, 
you’re willing to be irrational? You shouldn’t be irrational because…” And although the 
philosopher is embarrassed by his inability to complete this sentence in a noncircular fashion – 




This comic image no doubt resonates. Nevertheless, the hopeless pursuit Nozick describes is 
still preferable to attempting to remain ‘relevant’ to the person skipping away by offering a 
‘rational reconstruction’ of their patently irrational beliefs. A rejection of philosophy is not 
only, and not always, bad news for philosophy. 
While the ‘wish list’ approach endorsed here is clearly less likely to be deemed practically 
relevant from the perspective of contemporary business managers, there are other ways in 
which philosophers and business ethicists might seek to avoid remaining entirely inert. Private 
citizens and employees might be more sympathetic to accounts of business ethics that are out 
of step with the concerns and self-understanding of business managers. However, such groups 
typically do not have many opportunities to engage in conversation with philosophers and 
business ethicists, Nozick-style street encounters notwithstanding. Students, on the other hand, 
do. Therefore, it is students who we might be best placed to reach, not businesspeople. Whereas 
the latter are more likely to be thoroughly enculturated by their workplace context and culture, 
the former are more likely to be open to ideas which are sharply critical of existing business 
practice.  
Of course, business and management schools themselves enculturate students. Colby et al. 
argue that the four central pillars of business education – finance, accounting, marketing, and 
management – are dominated by market-based analytic frameworks, the application of which 
leads to clear and definitive answers. Because of this, students begin to believe that such 
frameworks unproblematically capture reality rather than represent a single and contestable 
perspective (2011, p.46). In light of this, Koehn suggests that business ethicists emphasis a 
liberal approach to education which “aims at liberating or freeing us from prejudices and 
misconceptions… the classroom experience should be transformational. The class should make 
students aware of their assumptions and habits and should lead them to examine both” (2005, 
p.141). Clearly this is incompatible with a model of business ethics which seeks to explicate 
existing practice. Such an approach has affinities with the claim that we attempt to engage with 
students as a public (Marinetto 2013, Dallyn et al. 2015) as a corrective to the narrow, hyper-
professionalised model of academia and higher education. 
To conceive of business ethics as being fundamentally concerned with normative questions of 
interest to an educated public, rather than relevant to practicing business managers runs counter 
to the increasingly marginalised position occupied by philosophers interested in business 
ethics. Moriarty notes that research in business ethics has increasingly placed less emphasis on 
normative theory and more emphasis on ‘descriptive’ accounts of ethics, which focus on “the 
causes and effects of purportedly ethical behavior” (2008, p.966). Van Liedekerke and Dubbink 
suggest that theoretical and normative research, indeed a “proper ethical perspective” (2008, 
p.273), has been marginalised in business ethics. Seele (2016) also notes the rise in business 
and management perspectives in place of philosophical research in the field. This trend 
suggests the field of business ethics has come to undervalue external scrutiny of business. The 
‘outsider’, as Kamm puts it, can help to make “us conscious of what we should be striving for, 
in what way our context is imperfect, and how it should be altered to make possible 
achievement of the ideal” (1990, p.18). 
This is not to say that the ethical quandaries of managers are not of interest, nor that the position 
developed here has no consequences for management. Indeed, part of the problem may be that, 
as Seele again notes, philosophy has become “more and more detached from applied and down-
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to-earth contexts such as business” (2018, p.648). The position developed here does not imply 
that we should revise the manager’s role so that it perfectly aligns with justice, but that we as 
individuals should, when we occupy managerial roles, be willing to use our discretion to depart 
from those roles when their demands are deemed to be excessively in conflict with justice or 
other important goods. To do this effectively would naturally involve a good deal of context-
dependent judgement about the likely efficacy of such ‘rebellions’. This form of managerial 
discretion is already, I take it, a key part of workplace life albeit one that perhaps deserves 
greater attention in the business ethics literature. 
While the vulnerability of shareholders grounds an important fiduciary duty on the part of 
management (Marcoux 2003), as Brown notes “[e]mployees, customers, and communities also 
have vulnerabilities that undergird other, non-fiduciary obligations” (2013, p.490). While this 
fiduciary relationship is important, it alone is not sufficient to support a primarily explicatory 
approach to business ethics. There are limits to the managerial fiduciary relationship that 
distinguish it from professional roles such as medicine or law – it is sometimes appropriate to 
depart from the fiduciary duty altogether, but this is not the case for doctors or lawyers. 
Medicine and law justify a deeper bracketing off, so that broader issues, e.g. utilitarian 
imperatives, are not justifiably part of the ethical deliberations of those involved. This is what 
underpins the fact that, on “questions of ordinary business operation… public policy dictates 
that corporations be allowed to take the interests of many constituencies besides shareholders 
into account” (Boatright 1994, p.404). Thus there is already a partial and tacit acceptance that 
business practice is subject to ethical concerns external to business, and beyond the fiduciary 
responsibilities of managers. In this light it is perhaps unfortunate that so much of the 
discussion of such matters falls under the banner of corporate social responsibility, a concept 
which attributes decision-making impetus and agency primarily to business. 
However, there is also a more general worry that by restricting business ethics to the domain 
of ordinary morality, we risk undermining it entirely. This is because, as Heath puts it, 
“[e]veryday morality contains a variety of principles that are implicitly, if not explicitly, 
anticapitalist” (2014, p.200). Indeed, Heath claims that his explicatory account of business 
ethics is “the most a normative theory can require without becoming anticapitalist” (2014, 
p.200). But there is an ambiguity here. A theory can be anticapitalist in a variety of ways. 
Firstly, a theory can regard capitalism as being morally irredeemable, and thus something to 
resist. Such a theory may still have much to say about issues which fall under the broad heading 
of ‘business ethics’, just as pacifists might be able to contribute to the conversation in military 
ethics. This basic point seems to inform a number of positions in business ethics which draw 
on radical egalitarian conceptions of social justice (Lippke 1991, 1995), Marxism (Shaw 2009, 
Sinnicks 2021), Adornian Critical Theory (Reeves and Sinnicks 2021), and so on. While such 
positions are entirely incompatible with an explicatory approach to business ethics, they are 
nevertheless able to contribute to the broader conversation about the ethical quality of markets, 
justice and capitalism, the nature of good work, and a variety of other topics. Of course, such 
positions do more than simply draw up wish lists, but nevertheless they would likely seem alien 
and unappealing to those whose habits and preferences have been shaped by business practice. 
In this way they might more meaningfully address the broader political debate, in which our 
‘anti-capitalist’ everyday morality can, and occasionally does, curtail business and the market. 
As Donaldson notes, “Corporate moral agency is plastic. It is malleable and should be shaped 
by democratic society working through its institutions.” (2017, p.128) 
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Secondly, a theory can be opposed to capitalism without holding that every aspect of capitalism 
is irredeemable, and perhaps regard capitalism as a necessary evil, or even a highly qualified 
good, all things considered. Indeed, Marx himself recognised that capitalism, at its historical 
juncture, was a progressive development. On this view, it is possible to hold that ethics is 
deeply in tension with the pressures of capitalist society, while still recognizing, perhaps with 
regret, that capitalism is the best system realistically available to us, at least for now. As such, 
it will still be worth resisting capitalism in many ways and on many occasions without opposing 
capitalism overall, and certainly without thinking that an opposition to capitalism makes it 
impossible to meaningfully address issues that arise only within capitalism. Such a position 
can clearly address both the issues of interest to the more radical position, as well as matters 
relevant to business practitioners. This means that we can have a coherently anti-capitalist 
business ethics, albeit one that departs markedly from the professional ethics model. 
This ‘lighter’ form of anti-capitalist business ethics might focus its critiques on the 
monomaniacal pursuit of profit, excessive acquisitiveness, and so on, rather than on endorsing 
a wholesale rejection of capitalism. Even if one has no appetite for Marx or Adorno, surely this 
kind of anti-capitalist impulse is compatible with meaningful reflection on the ethics of 
business. In light of this, and in line with Bowie (1985), Koehn (1994), and Steverson (2012), 
there is still scope to hold professionalism as an aspiration, one that may be more or less present 
in an individual’s own orientation to their work, where ‘professionalism’ is taken to imply a 
selfless commitment to public service. However, we may also hold this as an aspiration for 
almost any occupation, and one that is difficult to achieve within contemporary capitalism. In 
a world in which business practice were more closely aligned with market efficiency, and 
business practitioners more reliably motivated by advancing social prosperity, then the 
professional ethics model may have a stronger claim to our assent. But even then, the fact that 
the goods served by business are extrinsic to business practice make it hard to have any 
confidence that this is an achievable aspiration. This is not to say that it is not worth thinking 
about occupations and activities which fall under the broad banner of ‘business’ can be 
improved, and made to more closely align with our aspirations. In the – one hopes – better 
economic systems of the future, the kinds of fiduciary relationships common to both 
established professions and various business-related occupations are almost certain to retain an 
important place. Thus, there is value in exploring how the goods such occupations serve can 
best be promoted and safeguarded (see Boatright 2011, Herzog 2019), even if we should also 
keep the factors which limit the ethical status of such occupations clearly in view. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Business ethics should not be understood as a variety of professional ethics. While the 
professional aspirations of business have been an important feature in the history of business 
education as well as in the field of business ethics, business practice is too different from the 
established professions to justify the kind of separation from our ordinary ethical concerns that 
the professional ethics model requires. Appeals to the nature of business practice – the training 
it requires, its status as a recognisable practice, the informational impactedness involved – are 
unable to distinguish it from a range of fields for which the professional ethics model is 
inadequate. Furthermore, the goods served by business practice are either insufficient, as in the 
case of enhancing personal wealth or promoting consumer choice, or too extrinsically related 
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to that practice, as in the case of advancing social prosperity, for the professional model to 
apply to business ethics. Instead, we should prefer an approach to business ethics that retains a 
focus on our highest ethical and philosophical aspirations, even in the face of the charge of 
anti-capitalistic irrelevance that turns out, on closer inspection, to be unjustified.  
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